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Abstract—  Malware is a major threat to organizations. It 
incurs significant resources to contain their malicious activities. 
It affects business continuity and induces risks to organizations. 
Current anti-Malware solutions are proving to be ineffective 
against modern Malware.  Malware is being custom built to 
circumvent deployed defences against specific organizations or 
individuals belonging to certain organizations. When a Malware 
manages to penetrate an organization’s defences, there is a need 
to quickly contain the Malware and to keep control over the 
organization’s ICT assets before the risk escalates. In such 
incident, incident responders need to effectively carry out their 
containment plan. A prolonged containment response will induce 
greater risks to the attacked organization in the form of 
tarnished corporate  image, data loss and affected business 
continuity. Such infiltration can spread like a biological epidemic 
outbreak. These epidemic-like outbreaks can be modelled using 
mathematical models. However there are no models to assess the 
effectiveness of incident response plan. While mathematical 
models can be extended to support the simulation of response 
plan, there are many variable considerations that the incident 
response plan would need to factor in. Hence this research paper 
proposes the use of an Agent Based Model to aid incident 
responders in modelling and planning their containment 
response plan to minimize the impact of a Malware outbreak. 
Also in this paper, the model is used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of coordinated, against a non-coordinated containment plan. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Malware is growing in sophistication and effectiveness in 
achieving its malicious goals. While anti-Malware solutions 
are being developed to fend off such malice, they are not 
keeping in pace with the Malware developers in this battle 
over the control of targeted ICT assets. When a Malware 
successfully infiltrates an organization and renders the 
organization’s security defences useless, an appropriate 
response plan is needed to restore control of the ICT assets 
back to the owner or manager of the organization from the 
hackers or Malware perpetrators. If the outbreak is left 
unattended, the risks to the organization can escalate 
significantly and it could be detrimental to the organization. 
Possible risks induced by a successful Malware infection and 
outbreak include loss of sensitive and important data, loss of 
IT services used to support the organization’s business 
operations and tarnished organizational image. According to 
Campbell et al. [39], such security breaches will also induce 
negative reaction from the stock market. If the organization 
has a significant role related to the livelihood of a community 
or nation, as in the case of critical infrastructure such as power 
or water supply providers, lives dependent on the 
organization’s availability will be at risk.  
Organizations would typically respond to such infiltration 
and outbreak by deploying a security incident response team 
to contain the infection and minimize the effects of the attack. 
Some organizations establish a formal team called Computer 
Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) that is responsible 
to mitigate the effects of Malware infection and attacks. Wiik 
et al. [1] states that the CSIRT’s mission is to “minimize the 
impact of an incident to a company and allow it to get back to 
work as quickly as possible”. 
In order for the incident responders or CSIRTs to develop 
an optimal containment plan to deal with such malicious 
infiltration or outbreak, the team will need to come up with 
two important solutions. Firstly, the team will need to acquire 
one or more remediation options to contain the Malware 
which is derived from an understanding of the characteristics 
of the adversary. Secondly, they will need to define an optimal 
response plan based on an appreciation of the landscape where 
the Malware is infecting, and it also depends on the capability 
of the incident responders. The later solution has a number of 
attributes that need to be considered - like the location of the 
vulnerable computing resources, distance or connectivity 
options, and the availability of manpower with the necessary 
skills and knowledge to aid in the containment. A well-
prepared response team will have training, procedures and 
tools put in place prior to the incident. While such preparation 
can help to reduce the time required to carry out a 
containment plan for infiltration or outbreak, the plan will 
need to be reviewed to assess its suitability and effectiveness 
in containing the Malware at that critical moment in time. 
According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Incident 
Management framework for Malware [36], the assessment is 
part of the Triage  phase.  The effectiveness of  a response 
strategy in containing a Malware outbreak has a significant 
bearing to whether the organization is able to mitigate the 
risks induced by the Malware. An ineffective containment and 
response plan can be as bad as having no response to the 
outbreak. There are many challenges faced by the CSIRTs in 
carrying out a containment plan.  They originate from the 
threat itself, the environment they operate in and the 
responders themselves. The Malware adversary is advancing in its ability to carry 
out its mission. They have incorporated artificial intelligence 
[2]  to enhance their effectiveness to evade detection by 
security measures. The infiltration involves highly interactive 
capabilities to deceive the targeted victims into falling into 
their infectious traps  [3]. In addition, Malware has 
incorporated complex mechanisms to protect and preserve 
itself from containment and eradication. It includes self-
destruct capabilities and anti-forensic capabilities to protect 
the collective of Malware from any containment attempts. 
Beyond the sophistication of the adversary, there are 
challenges relating to the responders themselves and the 
environment that they operate in. The challenges include lack 
of staffing with adequate skills and knowledge, lack of 
policies and procedures for day-to-day operations, and lack of 
tools customized for incident response work. According to a 
report completed by the Software Engineering Institute  of 
Carnegie Mellon University about the state of the practice of 
CSIRT  [5], there are a number of limitations pervasively 
noted among the teams. In order to address these challenges 
faced by CSIRTs having lesser time to react, the solution is to 
have faster notification, automated incident handling of the 
tasks, easy and efficient means to analyse the information, 
effective mechanisms to collaborate and share information, 
well defined policies and procedures, streamlined processes to 
manage and respond to incidents, and personnel are to be 
better equipped to perform the work. Incident responders are 
challenged also by the need to execute a coordinated and 
timely containment plan. A report  by  Kossakowski  [4] 
indicated that CSIRT are overstretched. Among the reasons 
noted was the lack  of coordination mechanisms. This is 
especially so when the environments that the responders 
operate in vary widely in several dimensions like distances 
between infected hosts and having to deal with heterogeneous 
platforms and configurations. A hastily formed response team 
may experience greater difficulty in dealing with such 
challenges. 
In a case study reported by  Logan and Logan [6], the 
Malware outbreak had incurred significant costs and resources 
in order to recover from such outbreak. It is also noted from 
the paper that the case study took significant amount of time 
before the Malware outbreak was contained and restored the 
business operations.  In Verizon’s 2010 Data Breach 
Investigation report [7], it was reported  that containment 
typically takes days to months to contain a Malware infection. 
This is significantly longer than the seconds to minutes 
required for the infection to occur. Such time gap between an 
infection to the subsequent containment creates a large risk 
exposure to the organization. This time gap needs to be 
shortened. To achieve this intent, an optimal containment plan 
needs to be identified prior to the response execution phase of 
the containment plan.  
II.  MODELLING THE EPIDEMIC 
According to the work by Zelonis [8], Malware outbreak is 
likened to public health threats. The author went further to 
advocate using a public health response approach to counter 
the spread of Malware. Boase and Wellman [9] argued that 
the transmission characteristics of Malware is likened to that 
of biological equivalents. While it is acknowledged in the 
paper that the computer viruses and biological viruses have 
different constituent elements and processes, they are bound 
by the same connectivity realities. Given this premise, hence 
epidemic models may be used to study the effectiveness of 
containment plans for the Malware epidemic that occurs 
within an organization. Such epidemic models allow 
researchers and responders to optimize their containment plan 
to mitigate the risks imposed by the outbreak. A notably 
popular and simple model used frequently in epidemic 
modelling is the SIR model from Kermack and McKendrick 
[21] that compartmentalizes the community under threat into 
three states namely “Susceptible”, “Infected” and 
“Recovered”. The model has deterministic characteristics.  
There are many epidemic models developed to simulate the 
propagation behaviour of Malware  in order to forecast the 
extent of infection caused by the Malware. There are a few 
models for containment using specific remediation activity or 
mechanisms like patching. However there is no model on the 
impact of incident response containment plans by incident 
responders or CSIRTs to the propagation progress of Malware 
epidemic outbreak. Staniford et al.[10] studied the epidemic 
effects that a Malware has and advocated the creation of 
“Cyber-Center for Disease Control” to identifying outbreaks, 
rapidly analysing pathogens, fighting infections, anticipating 
new vectors, proactively devising detectors for new vectors 
and resisting future threats. However they stopped short on 
defining a model to evaluate the effectiveness of ‘Fighting 
Infections’ as part of the reactive response and containment 
strategy. Arino et al.[24]  advocated that simple epidemic 
models can be used in the analysis of containment efforts. 
However in a containment plan, there are many variables that 
contribute to the effectiveness of response and containment 
plan. Using the mathematically based epidemic model to 
simulate such variations will greatly complicate the model and 
hinder its use. It seems that there is no optimal  model to 
simulate the effectiveness of response / containment efforts by 
incident responders against a Malware outbreak  while 
supporting the many variables and considerations.  
III. RESEARCH PROPOSITION 
The research proposition in this paper and its contribution 
is the use of an Agent Based Model (ABM) to simulate and 
evaluate the effectiveness of incident responders / CSIRTs of 
their response plan to contain Malware outbreaks. According 
to Macal and North [38],  ABM  is “a new approach to 
modelling systems comprising of autonomous, interacting 
agents”. An ABM consists of a collection  of agents, an 
environment, and a  set of codified  rules  for  managing  the 
agents' behaviour and activities. Each agent will carry its own 
attributes representing its current state. It will also have a step 
function (usually stochastically) that moves the agents from 
their current state to the next state at each time step. An ABM 
provides the means to analyse systems’ behaviour using 
"what-if" analysis under different conditions. This will aid in the evaluation of control strategy options to fight epidemics. 
In our context, the  characteristics of actors involved in a 
Malware outbreak, namely the Malware itself and incident 
responders, are autonomous and interactive among themselves 
and in their fight against each other. Hence the Agent Based 
form of modelling will provide the means and flexibility to 
simulate ‘what-if’ scenarios in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness  of various containment approach options. The 
following are supporting reasons to use ABM in modelling 
containment strategies by incident responders. 
 
a.  Intelligence  –  Malware has been noted to contain 
aspects of intelligence to achieve its objectives to 
infiltrate, steal and stay hidden; similarly human 
would exhibit greater intelligence capacity to adapt 
and deal with the situation. 
b.  Purposeful – Malware has its objectives encoded into 
itself and will progressively update itself over time; 
human responders’ activities will be driven with an 
intent to contain the Malware from further 
escalations and totally eradicate the malice. 
c.  Situated in space and time – The scenario will exist 
over an organization’s enterprise infrastructure and 
time is an important variable included in the 
modelling (both mathematical and agent based) 
 
With the base ABM for containment developed, the study 
of having a coordinated containment strategy is evaluated. 
The research hypothesis is that a coordinated containment 
plan is more effective than a non-coordinated one. The next 
section reports some related research in modelling Malware 
outbreak and containment. This is followed by a description of 
the model and evaluation method. The results of the 
evaluation will then be presented. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of the results and future directions of the use of 
ABM to simulate modelling of Malware  containment  by 
incident responders.  
IV. RELATED WORK 
This section looks into the existing solutions and research 
development on the modelling of Malware outbreak and 
containment.  
A. Propagation Model of Malware or Computer 
Epidemiology  
Garetto et al.[13]  advocated the use of numeric analysis 
methods, specifically used the algebra of interactive Markov 
chains, to model the propagation behaviour of Malware on a 
network. The Random Constant Spread (RCS) model, based 
on differential equations,  was developed by Staniford et al. 
[10]  using empirical data derived from the outbreak of the 
CodeRed worm  to model its propagation.  Chen et al.[14] 
suggested the use of mathematically based discrete time 
model called Analytical Active Worm Propagation (AAWP) 
to characterize worm propagation. Analysis of their model 
was done against an Epidemiological model. Vlachos et al.[16] 
advocated the use of network graph to model computer 
epidemiology. Zou et al.[11] used a simple epidemic model 
and exponential models to analyse their monitoring and early 
detection system that studies the trends of malicious activities. 
Kim et al.[19] extended the basic SIR Model to support the 
analysis of the dynamics of incubation period of epidemic 
Malware code. Most research focused on network based 
Malware propagation, Faghani  and Saidi [15]  used the 
Epidemic model to simulate Malware propagation over social 
networking sites. 
Malware outbreak can be studied using epidemic models, 
however there are limits and studies by Zou et al.[11] have 
noted such limits. They cited that such models will not be able 
to characterize the setup of the environment in which the 
Malware outbreak occurs. Also, such models cannot factor in 
the collaborative characteristics of Malware. However  in 
another research paper by the same authors (Zou et. al) [12] 
argued that epidemic models are still relevant to compute the 
propagation of Malware (specifically of a worm). While the 
simple and generic epidemic models like SIS or SIR are 
commonly used, these models covered herein this section do 
not model containment scenarios considerations.  
B. Countermeasures variable in modelling  
Goranin and Cenys [18] proposed the use of genetic based 
algorithms to model Botnet propagation and its impact when 
countermeasures exist. However this model looks at the 
measure taken by defence mechanism deployed less the 
contribution from incident responders. Ingols et al.[23] used 
attack graph to model the spread and countermeasures. Like 
Goranin and Cenys’ model, it did not consider CSIRT or 
responders’ contribution or how best to optimize the 
deployment of responders. Li et al.[22] developed a model to 
estimate the maximum likely impact of a zero-day Malware 
outbreak based on the size of susceptible host population 
based on the inter-arrival times of distinct scanners detected 
by the dark port detectors in order to aid in defining a network 
and collaborative containment strategy in an enterprise 
network. Sellke et al.[17] proposed the use of the stochastic 
branching process model to characterize the propagation of 
worms and proposed the idea of restricting scans to unique IP 
addresses. While the model studied a containment strategy, it 
was limited in scope or support for variety of variation to the 
strategy. Brumley et al.[25]  created a taxonomy for 
containment strategies and evaluated them during a Malware 
outbreak by using epidemic models. However the response 
strategies covered in that research did not consider the 
involvement of incident responders or CSIRTs, and their 
limits. Chen and Jamil [26]  suggested using an epidemic 
model to simulate the efforts used to quarantine a worm 
epidemic. Their model considered effectiveness of partial 
containment and studied the size of networks. They 
considered the variable of importance of network in the 
containment strategy. However, the limits of the model 
prevented comprehensive support of complex models of ‘what 
ifs’. Also, it did not look into the considerations of incident 
responders. Zou et al.[27]  modelled the effects of network 
topologies in the spread of Malware propagation via email. They did include a static immunization model that entails 
having computing nodes made non-vulnerable to the Malware 
passively. They advocated future developments to include 
dynamic process of immunization which is intended to be 
covered in this paper. 
C. Agent Based Modelling  
Bose and Shin [28]  proposed an  Agent based Malware 
Model (AMM) to study the propagation behaviour of Malware 
on mobile devices.  However it lacked containment 
considerations. Kim et al.[29] demonstrated the use of Agent 
based Model to demonstrate it can be used to estimate and 
predict the spread of Avian Influenza (AI) in various attributes 
and environments in a given population (South Korea) and to 
aid in the identify an effective means to contain the flu. Khalil 
et al.[30] is another example illustrated the use of Agent-based 
Model to identify optimal containment strategies for a 
Pandemic in Egypt. Nevertheless, to the knowledge of the 
authors, there has been no attempt on the modelling of 
containment of Malware by incident responders. 
V. METHODOLOGY 
Given the unavailability of a model to meet the needs, the 
proposition is to use an Agent Based Modelling (ABM) to 
simulate the Malware outbreak and a response strategy to 
contain the outbreak by incident responders. The approach 
involves the use of a multi-agent system to model incident 
responders carrying out containment of Malware within an 
organization’s network. The ABM model developed uses the 
compartmental model which has three states – ‘Susceptible’, 
‘Infected’ and ‘Recovered’ liken to that of SIR. The Agent 
Based Modelling tool used in this research is Netlogo [31]. 
This ABM adopted in this study is termed “Agent based 
Malware Containment Modelling (AMCM)”. 
A. Configuration of the Model  
One key component considered  in the model is the 
parameters to be included in the AMCM. They form the basis 
to represent the model and to facilitate scenario experiments. 
There are three types of parameters.  The first type is the 
constants used to represent the model system. They carry the 
same constant value throughout all simulations. The second 
type is the global variables used in the model. The values of 
these variables may change with each time step. They reflect 
the state of the model at any particular time step. The third 
type is the parameters used to create the variety of scenarios 
used in the modelling. 
 
Parameter  Default Value 
Population size of hosts   3721 
Random Seed  0 
Lead Time to identify remediation  400 time steps 
Infection Rate  0.04 (or 4%) 
Table 1 – Constants 
 
Parameter  Initial Value 
Number of Susceptible hosts   3720 
Number of Infected hosts  1 
Number of Recovered hosts  0 
Table 2 – Global Variables 
 
Parameter  Range Values 
Number of Incident Responders  Integer (0 to 100) 
Prioritization Option  Boolean (On or Off) 
Prioritization Levels  Integer (0 to 3) 
Find Next Host (Overseer)  Boolean (On or Off) 
Table 3 – Scenario Variables 
 
The AMCM, implemented in Netlogo, has three agents, 
namely the Malware involved in the outbreak, vulnerable 
computing hosts and responders or CSIRTs. The mentioned 
parameters and agents have been coded into the simulation 
model in order to simulate the characteristics of various agents 
involved and support ‘what-if’ scenarios. Also included in the 
model is the lead time required by the CSIRTs to identify the 
appropriate remediation plan to contain the outbreak. There is 
an overseer that plays the overall coordinator of the CSIRT 
agents. It directs the CSIRT agents to attend to infected hosts 
nearest to responders or directs the selection of hosts to attend 
to. The overseer’s function can be turned on or off when 
required. There is one main monitored graph included in the 
AMCM model. It is the graph of number of 
susceptible/infected/recovered hosts over time. The following 
listing is an extract of codes programmed into Netlogo to 
support the intended model. 
  
 Figure 1 – Sample Netlogo Code for the AMCM 
There are assumptions incorporated into the model. One 
key assumption is that the lead time, which is a global variable 
parameter, is sufficient to identify the required remediation 
solution to contain Malware and to turn an Infected host to 
Recovered status. The CSIRTs are only deployed after the 
remediation solution identification lead time has lapsed. The 
effectiveness of the remediation is not considered in this 
model. An assumption that the remediation solution works 
with the Malware is included. Another assumption is 
travelling latency between hosts for the incident responder is 
negligible and not included into the model though the model 
can be modified to include it. 
B. Evaluation Approach  
The validation of the proposed Agent Based 
epidemiological simulation model cannot be easily done due 
to the lack of publicly available and reliable field data of past 
Malware outbreak incidents that occurred within contained 
environment like an organization’s network. Sensitivity of 
such data with respect to an organization, even if it was ever 
captured is a constraint, hence such data is not easily obtained. 
Also, there are procedural considerations and resource 
constraints with any attempt to reconstruct a Malware 
outbreak with containment to gather sampling data for the 
analysis. In order to overcome  these limitations, an 
epidemiological model was developed to simulate the 
Malware outbreak using a mature modelling approach and 
perform model alignment. The approach was developed by 
Axtell et al. [37], which involves aligning both computational 
models or “docking” to match the output of the proposed 
Agent Based Model to that of the mature epidemiological 
model using available and limited published information 
about the Malware spread characteristics. Such model 
alignment approach has been used in other model propositions. 
For example, Vlachos et al.[20] proposed a graph model to 
study the spread of Malware as an early warning system. They 
used generic epidemic model from Kermack and McKendrick 
[21] to verify their model. Chen et al. [32] did the same for the 
simulation of smallpox outbreak. Khalil et al.[30]’s paper on 
Agent-based Modelling of Pandemic used the same approach. 
Skvortsov et al.[33]  argued that aligning the inputs and 
outputs of both Agent Based Model and SIR model provides a 
necessary foundational validation step so that the ABM can be 
extended to handle more complex scenarios which is the 
intent of this research. Our validated ABM would 
subsequently take on the role of the base model for modelling 
containment scenarios of incident responders. In our research, 
that mature model is the basic SIR model that is used 
extensively in modelling Malware propagation as mentioned 
in the previous section. Also, the available but limited 
published information about the Malware to be modelled is 
the infection rate.  
The evaluation plan for our proposed model is to first do a 
model alignment with SIR in order to achieve general 
equivalence in the model’s characteristics. This is then 
followed by the evaluation of specific scenarios of 
containment in the new model. The following details the 
evaluation taken in this research. 
 
Stage 1 
a.  Generate output of an epidemic model on the 
spread of Malware using SIR with inclusion of 
CSIRTs containment effort. 
b.  Generate output from the AMCM with the same 
scenario 
c.  Align Models based on outputs of models 
 
Stage 2 
a.  Scenario test A –  Increase number of incident 
responders in coordinated execution vs non-
coordinated execution 
b.  Scenario test B –  Prioritization of containment 
plan to Infected hosts in coordinated execution vs 
non-coordinated execution  
 
In the model alignment stage, both our new AMCM and 
SIR model will model the spread characteristics of the 
notorious Conficker which has infected millions of computers 
in Internet since Nov 2008. Publicly available information 
about the characteristics of the outbreak of Conficker is in 
context of the global Internet network which is not applicable 
in our context, however the publicised information about 
infection rate will be used. According to the technical report 
by SRI International for Office of Naval Research, USA [34] 
and a report by InfoSecurity.com [35], the infection rate of 
this Malware is 4%. The rate of infection is applied to both 
models. The rate of removal by the incident responders’ 
participation and lead time to identify the remediation will be 
factored in into both the AMCM and SIR model. For the SIR 
model, the main mathematical equations are as follows. 
 
 
ds
dt
= −βs(t)i(t)
di
dt
= βs(t)i(t) − ki(t)
dr
dt
= ki(t)
 
 
This is supported by the following parameters. 
 
= β  Infection parameter or rate of infection 
 
n
m
k =  is the removal parameter; it is greater than zero 
after a constant lead time for the analysis to be 
completed and the remediation to be identified. 
 
m is 
the number of CSIRTs deployed and 
 
n  is the 
population of the susceptible computer resources 
within an organization. 
 Once the foundational evaluation using model alignment 
has been done, we use AMCM to validate the hypothesis that 
a coordinated incident response plan is more effective in 
containment and bringing the outbreak propagation to a stop 
than having a non-coordinated plan. In order to evaluate this 
hypothesis, two scenarios are used. The first scenario is the 
number of responders responding to the Malware outbreak. 
The other is the prioritization of the selection of hosts to 
attend to first as part of the containment plan. The first 
scenario considers the improvement in containment with 
increased number of responders when there is a coordinated 
response over a non-coordinated response. As more 
responders participate in the containment, it is obvious that 
they will be able to bring the outbreak to a closure faster. 
However having coordinated response plan will improve the 
deployment of the added resources and minimize or remove 
any wastages in terms of deployment. The non-coordinated 
response will have a randomized behaviour in the selection of 
host response at each step turn. Having such characteristic will 
result in having more than one responder attending to one host, 
hence inducing duplication of activities. This will induce 
wastage in valuable time and effort.  
Another  containment scenario completed in this research 
was to prioritize  the assignment of incident responders to 
infected  computing assets. It is deemed some computing 
assets are more important than the others. This scenario will 
also be tested with coordinated response and without. An 
example of when prioritization is required is for hosts that 
store sensitive data like a file sharing server and hosts of 
important individuals within the organization. Another is 
computing resources that render computing services to many 
dependent hosts or users like the HR ERP system. The 
measurement used in both scenarios in the evaluation of the 
hypothesis is the number of time steps taken to contain the 
outbreak or to have no remaining infected hosts.  
VI. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This section analyses the results of the staged tests outlined 
in the previous section. The first set of tests evaluated the 
accuracy of the Agent Based Model against a mature 
mathematical epidemic model specifically SIR. The second 
set of tests involved conducting two test scenarios with the 
intention of validating the premise that a form of command 
and control structure over the responders is better than 
autonomous uncoordinated response plan as part of the 
containment plan to a Malware outbreak within an 
organization’s network. 
A. Stage 1 – Model Alignment :  AMCM vs SIR  
The output of AMCM was compared to the SIR model’s 
output. The general characteristics of both outputs were 
similar but not exactly the same. This could be because of: (i) 
the extent of parameter considerations included into the model 
for AMCM, (ii) random characteristics of the AMCM for 
selection of susceptible hosts to be infected vs the 
deterministic characteristics in SIR model, and (iii) the 
definition of limits of responders in AMCM against that of 
SIR model. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – SIR Model Output 
 
 
Figure 3 – AMCM Output 
 
One significant difference between the two models is the 
rate of removal of Infected hosts. The AMCM  performed 
faster  than  the  SIR model. This is  possibly  because of the 
discrete characteristics of the AMCM  compared with the 
mathematical continuous characteristics of the SIR model (eg, 
At time 0, there will be  10 hosts infected, 2 CSIRTs, the 
recovery ratio is 0.2 or 2 hosts recovered; at time 1, there will 
be 8 hosts infected and 2 CSIRTs responding, recovery ratio is 
0.16 which is not 2 whole hosts being recovered). Hence the 
Agent Based Modelling may better simulate real-life 
conditions where one responder handles one hosts compared 
to partial handling of hosts as computed by the mathematical 
SIR model. 
B. Stage 2 – Scenario Tests  
The two scenarios used to evaluate the intended hypothesis 
are an increased number of responders and the prioritization 
of containment based on the risk implication induced by the 
host if it is infected. For the first scenario, tests were carried 
out with 10 incident responders and 100 incident responders 
separately in AMCM. 
  
Figure 4 – AMCM Screen Capture for Scenario A 
 
 
Figure 5 – Scenario A Output with 10 Incident Responders 
With Coordination Oversight 
 
 
Figure 6 – Scenario A Ouput with 10 Incident Responders 
Without Coordination Oversight 
 
 
Figure 7 – Scenario A Output with 100 Incident Responders 
With Coordination Oversight 
 
 
Figure 8 – Scenario A Output with 100 Incident Responders 
Without Coordination Oversight 
 
From the experiments, it is noted when more incident 
responders are deployed (from 10 to 100), the faster the 
containment goal was achieved. This premise is obvious even 
when there is no order to the execution of the containment. 
However, when there is oversight and coordination over 
responders, the time taken (in terms of time step in the 
simulation) to contain the Malware outbreak reduces 
significantly hence a better containment strategy. The 
following table summarizes the measurements taken with 
different number of responders and whether there is overall 
coordination in response. 
 
    10 Responders  100 Responders 
  Coordinated  872 (Figure 5)  457 (Figure 7) 
  Uncoordinated  8835 (Figure 6)  1146 (Figure 8) 
 
Similarly when prioritizing on the selection of hosts to deal 
with first results improves when there is oversight and 
coordination over the responders.  In this scenario test, there 
are two levels of importance (high or low). The responder 
agents are coded  to handle first the high importance hosts 
before proceeding to the low importance hosts. The difference 
shades of red represent the difference importance levels.   
Figure 9 – AMCM Screen Capture for Scenario B 
 
 
Figure 10 – Scenario B Output with Prioritization and 
Coordination Oversight 
  
 
Figure 11 – Scenario B Output with Prioritization Without 
Coordination Oversight 
 
The graphs show significant improvement in response time 
for the coordinated in Figure 10 (618 time steps) against the 
uncoordinated in Figure 11 (4516 time steps).  
VII.  DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The AMCM was first validated against the classic SIR 
model. Generally the results were similar in terms of the 
characteristics of the graph but the results were not exactly the 
same due to the characteristics of models as explained in the 
previous section. However this allowed us to extend our 
AMCM model to simulate more complex scenarios for the 
next stage of testing.  
The next stage of experiments was to evaluate the 
hypothesis of having a coordinated containment plan with two 
scenarios. The outcome of the experiments showed that 
CSIRTs or incident responders are more effective against a 
Malware outbreak when there is coordinated execution of 
containment against a non-coordinate one. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The characteristic of a containment strategy has significant 
contribution to the outcome of containment efforts and risks 
impact induced by a Malware outbreak. Using an Agent Based 
Model to simulate the containment strategy can aid incident 
responders or CSIRTs define a better respond plan to Malware 
outbreak to minimize the organization’s risks. It has been 
shown through our Agent based Malware Containment Model 
(AMCM), which is the first of its kind to the best of our 
knowledge,  that  having  a  coordinated response approach 
improves the execution of containment plans when there is an 
increase in responders or when there is a need to prioritize the 
containment in order to eradicate  the Malware that has 
infected important hosts and  posing  greater  risks to the 
organization. 
AMCM can be enhanced to  include  more parameters to 
better emulate the real-world conditions and to support tests of 
other hypotheses. Possible examples of parameters to be 
incorporated include the following. 
a.  Inclusion of topology of network to better simulate 
spread efficiency 
b.  User participation  
c.  Enterprise Security Infrastructure to deter spread 
or to assist in containment 
d.  Adaptive  Malware that is able to fend off the 
containment attempts 
e.  Re-infection of hosts by same Malware which can 
be induced by the shortcoming the remediation or 
sophistication of Malware involved. 
In this research, time step measurements were used to 
assess the effectiveness of containment approaches. 
Enhancement can be made to this to include the extent of data 
loss, in terms of data leakage or data destruction, by the 
Malware in the infected hosts over time. Such form of 
measurement will be useful in evaluating prioritization 
containment strategy.  Finally, the simulation  model can be 
integrated  with  the actual incident response environment, 
specifically to the actual computing hosts,  to  conduct 
simulation  scenarios and perform strategy evaluation in a 
realistic setting using a similar approach used by Nicol et al 
[40] with power system security evaluation.  
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